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Chapter VI
GOING ‘BEHIND THE BORDER’
By Christopher Findlay
Introduction
Important trends in the forms of international business and in the perceptions of
policy priorities are shifting the orientation of policymakers to measures, both at home and
in foreign markets, that operate “behind the border”.  This phrase is used here to refer to
a variety of domestic regulatory practices.  This shift of attention is raising questions about
the role of international cooperation in managing policy reform.  It is argued here that
international  cooperation  provides  options  for  capacity-building,  mechanisms  for  the
commitment  of  policy  reform  to  avoid  backsliding  and  for  capturing  spillovers  between
economies  in  regulatory  reform.    Consideration  of  these  options  and  their  application
highlights  the  value  of  WTO  processes  in  particular  as  well  as  their  principles.    This
argument  also  has  implications  for  the  application  of  preferential  trade  negotiations  to
these issues.
A.  Business and policy trends
Significant business and policy trends are leading to a redefinition of the list of
priorities among policy measures relevant to international business.  One of these trends
is the growth of options for doing international business, particularly in the services sector.
Cross-border  transactions  in  services  (which  are  the  services  transactions  recorded  in
balance of payments data) grew as rapidly as merchandise trade (10 per cent on average
during 2000-2002), then slightly lower than goods trade in the subsequent three years
(15 per cent compared with 17 per cent in goods trade in 2003, 19 per cent compared with
21 per cent in 2004 and 11 per cent compared with 13 per cent in 2005).
1
There  are  significant  variations  among  countries  in  these  growth  rates,  and  in
some developing countries services exports have increased rapidly (see table below).  For
example, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members have recorded high
growth rates in this form of cross-border services transactions that were close to world
average rates.  Trade in services in this form in India has grown much faster than in the
rest of the world, and in China at slightly lower rates than the world as a whole, except for
rapid growth in recent years.
1 WTO, World Trade Report, 2006, table 3.184
The types of services transactions recorded in balance of payments data are not
the only form in which services can be traded.  Also important is the establishment of
offshore operations to deal direct with consumers in their own markets.
2 It is difficult to
isolate  the  value  of  business  transactions  in  services  in  this  form.    In  its  2004
World Investment Report, UNCTAD stressed the shift to services in world foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows.  The report said that in the 1970s, services projects accounted for
a quarter of world FDI stock and less than half by 1990; however, by 2002 the figure had
risen to 60 per cent (see figure 3 of the report).  Services accounted for two-thirds of FDI
inflows during 2001-2002.  Services investors are mainly from developed countries, but in
the 1990s the developing country share of the global FDI stock in services started to grow
World trade of commercial services by region and selected countries, 2005
(Units:  US$ billion and percentage)
Exports Imports
Value Annual percentage change Value Annual percentage change
2005
2000-




World 2 415 10 15 19 11 2 361 10 14 18 11
North 420 5 5 11 10 373 7 8 15 10
America
South and 68 8 10 16 20 70 5 14 22
Central
America
Europe 1 233 11 19 19 7 1 119 11 19 16 8
CIS 40 18 16 23 20 20 17 24 18
Africa 13 26 20 12 66 12 16 19 15
Middle East 54 11 27 14 12 80 11 19 20 11
Asia 543 12 10 26 19 595 10 10 25 15
  Japan 107 8 8 25 12 136 3 3 22 1
  China 81 22 18 34 31 85 19 19 31 19




    I n d i a 6 8 3 32 16 67 6 6 7 2 92 35 37 3
  ASEAN (10) 104 8 2 22 10 132 9 9 21 14
Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2006, appendix table 2, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres06_e/pr437_e.htm#table2_appendix.
a For composition of country groups see the Technical Notes of WTO, International Trade
Statistics, 2005.
b Taiwan province of China, Hong Kong, China, Republic of Korea and Singapore.
2 The “movement of people” or the fourth mode of supply of services is not considered here.185
and by 2002 they accounted for 10 per cent of the outward stock (they host 25 per cent of
the inward stock).
A recent Australian study supported the significance of FDI in services transactions.
It found that transactions from offshore establishments were significantly understated in
official statistics.  Balance of payments statistics might only be capturing about 36 per cent
of  total  actual  services  exports  (Australian  Bureau  of  Statistics,  2004,  and  Australian
Services Roundtable, 2005).  Financial and insurance services as well as other business
and professional services were the key sectors involved.
UNCTAD has suggested that the shifts towards services in FDI flows are related to
the growth of the service sector in developed and developing economies (associated with
growth and changes in business procurement strategies), the nature of services and the
value of direct contact with consumers, and the change in policy environments.  Movement
offshore and outsourcing are examples of these processes at work.  Another factor maybe
the movement offshore of manufacturing sector clients of service sector firms, or manufactured
product exporters setting up complementary services business, such as “after-sales support
or repairs”.
Another important trend is the decline in the importance of some policy measures
affecting  international  business,  particularly  those  that  operate  at  the  border.    Beghin
(2006), in a review of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, noted the decline in tariff rates on
average and the shift in the mix of NTBs.  He reported that:
(a) In  2005,  the  unweighted  (applied)  average  tariff  was  about  3  per  cent  in
high-income countries and 11 per cent in developing countries, compared
with levels about three times as high in 1980;
3
(b) The use of NTBs involving quantity or price controls, or financial measures,
had decreased dramatically from 45 per cent of tariff lines faced by NTBs in
1990 to 15 per cent in 2004;
(c) The use of other types of NTBs had increased from 55 per cent “of all NTBs
in 1994 to 85 per cent in 2004”.  Examples of such measures include technical
barriers to trade.
However, these trends are not universal.  Average tariff rates vary considerably
between countries, both at applied and MFN levels (Drysdale and Findlay, 2006).  In some
sensitive sectors, traditional border barriers remain the priority issue, in agricultural trade,
for example, and in textiles and clothing sectors in some economies.  The traditional trade
policy agenda continues to be worth attention (see, for example, Anderson, Martin and
Valenzuela, 2005); at the same time, however, the focus of many international businesses
is shifting “inland”.
3 Details are available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/tar2005.xls.186
B.  New policy issues
The consequence of these shifts is greater interest in behind-the-border policy.  For
example, consider the shift in the composition of significant NTBs to technical measures.
As a consequence, there is also relatively greater interest in the administrative processes
that are associated with their application, such as the design and testing of standards
applied to goods and services (e.g., professional services).  These processes are related
to domestic procedures and practices that are linked to the way that governments operate.
Business people frequently complain about the application of these measures.
These trends also combine to direct greater attention to measures affecting businesses
operating in other modes (for example, businesses through establishment).  That focus
also directs attention to regulatory practices that operate behind the border.  Examples of
these policy categories include registration and licensing, rules on operations, locations
and forms of establishment of offshore businesses.
A related concern is the often expressed exasperation with “red tape”.  In 2006, the
Australian Government set up a Taskforce on Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Business
that produced a report on “Rethinking regulation”.  Issues identified included excessive
coverage, overlapping regulation, variation in definitions, excessive reporting and lack of
justification.  Costs identified including significant costs of compliance.  To this might be
added the costs of uncertainty associated with the outcome of any bureaucratic process.
Some of the regulatory measures of concern to business were originally introduced
to solve problems of market failure.  For example, standards are used to offset the lack of
consumer information and manage the recognition of professional qualifications.  They
can, however, become barriers to international transactions.  Other processes applied for
the sake of consumer protection can have similar effects.  Other regulatory practices for
dealing with externalities might contain a bias against foreign providers (for example, rules
on motor vehicle emissions to deal with urban smog).  Competition policy measures, which
could also fall into this category, are discussed below.
Beghin (2006) pointed out that whether a policy measure was protectionist or not
was often difficult to determine.  He suggested the rule that if a policy measure was “equal
to the measure that a social planner would implement for domestic purposes (i.e., all firms
are domestic firms or all agents belong to a single economy), the NTB is presumably
non-protectionist”.
Problems could arise in these policy areas from inappropriate application of the
policy measure (due to either capture or error).  At one end, there is excessive regulatory
activity, which adds to the costs of doing business in order to comply, restricts business
development or creates barriers to entry.  This could occur, for example, in the application
of licensing arrangements or standards setting systems.
At the other extreme could be insufficient application of measures, such as the
absence of a measure to support international business.  Some concern has been voiced,187
for  example,  about  the  lack  of  a  consumer  protection  regime  to  apply  to  cross-border
financial transactions.  Similarly, the absence of an access regime in critical infrastructure
sectors could inhibit competition in downstream markets.
These problems in application, either to excess or to an insufficient degree, could
affect both domestic and international firms.  These measures are not necessarily restricted
in their incidence to discrimination against foreign suppliers.  They can affect market entry
generally, not just the terms of foreign market entry, and they have implications for competition
in the market place.  Even application that does not discriminate against foreign firms
could also be rent- and cost-creating.
Significant  gains  might  be  expected  from  reform  of  these  sorts  of  measures.
Beghin (2006) pointed out that most analyses of non-tariff measures identified three effects:
(a) A rent-creating effect for protected firms.  (Beghin refers to “the domestic
sector” as the recipient of the rents, but that sector could include firms owned
by foreigners);
(b) A  supply  curve  shift  due  to  costs  of  compliance.    (These  costs  might  be
incurred by both domestic and foreign firms);
(c) A  demand-shift  effect,  when  the  measure  enhances  “demand  with  new
information or by reducing an externality”.
Dee and others (2006) argued that “liberalization of rent-creating barriers will yield
‘triangle gains’ in producer and consumer surplus associated with improvements in allocative
efficiency...but  would  also  have  redistributive  effects  associated  with  the  elimination  of
rents  to  incumbents.    Alternatively,  liberalization  of  cost-escalating  barriers...would  be
equivalent  to  a  productivity  improvement  (saving  in  real  resources),  and  yield  ‘roughly
rectangle’ gains associated with a downward shift in supply curves”.  They noted that this
could increase returns for the incumbent service providers as well as lower costs for users
elsewhere in the economy.  They observed that the aggregate welfare effect of measures
that were cost-creating (for the same movement in the supply curve) would be greater
than rent-creating measures, that is, the rectangle gains were likely to exceed triangle
gains by a significant margin.  They also noted that the differential effects on incumbent
suppliers  suggested  the  political  economy  of  a  reform  programme  would  differ  for
cost-escalating measures compared to those that added to rents.
The  intersectoral  effects  of  the  reforms  of  these  measures  are  also  significant.
Consider, for example, the impact of logistics reforms on the rest of the economy – a more
efficient transport sector reduces rents, lowers costs and cuts transport margins.  This
reduced margin is distributed between consumers, including export customers and producers.
In markets where domestic prices are set by world prices, the bulk of this gain will be
captured by producers (who face a close to perfectly elastic demand curve).  In developing
economies, these producers may be relatively poor agricultural producers.188
The gains from reform of these types of measures are expected to be substantial,
but capturing them is a matter of domestic policy change.  It is important for domestic
policy processes to respond to these issues.  Another report on national regulatory reform
released  by  the  Australian  Productivity  Commission  in  February  2007  identified  the
productivity gains from reform in the health and education sectors.  It found gains of at
least 2 per cent of GDP from the reform package in these sectors.
Dee  (2006)  stressed  the  value  of  reform  of  this  type  to  “increase  the  general
contestability of markets”, by allowing allcomers, domestic and foreign, to enter.  She said
reforms should “safeguard competition not particular competitors”.  She noted that reform
was  not  easy  because  of  the  different  players  involved  and  their  conflicting  interests.
Reform requires both an understanding of policy alternatives and a set of institutions for
managing change.  It is possible Dee was suggesting (drawing on a taxonomy provided by
Ross Garnaut) that governments:
(a) Are unaware of best practice;
(b) Are aware of best practice, but face resistance to change;
(c) Themselves do not want better practice.
Dee proposed that formal, independent and public policy reviews had a key role to
play in both identifying “better practice” (which may vary by stage of development) and
managing the vested interests involved, including government itself.
While  the  focus  of  change  is  on  domestic  processes,  international  cooperation
might provide some benefit.  That is, it may be worthwhile for the institutions of international
cooperation to explore the scope to work behind the border.  The question, then, is what
can international cooperation offer in this context?
C.  Contribution of international cooperation
International cooperation can make contributions in three ways (the three Cs):
(a) Supporting the policy review process by providing information on options for
policy reform and suggesting paths of evolution of policy (capacity-building);
(b) Adding to the credibility of reforms through commitments to policy change,
(commitments);
(c) Capturing spillovers between policy reform in different countries (capturing
spillovers).
With  regard  to  capacity-building,  Dee  (2006)
4 noted that regional bodies could
assist the policy review process by “marshalling expertise”, and providing a forum for the
exchange of experiences about conducting reviews.  She argued, however, that if regional
4 The paper was written with reference to APEC.189
assistance was to be helpful it should not only be involved in the identification of policy
options but also in “selling them”.  The latter involves direct contact with local stakeholders
and,  she  suggested,  “real  follow-up”  by  a  lead  minister  who  would  be  responsible  for
arranging consultation processes, releasing reports and prompting coordinated responses
from all ministers affected.  Participation by ministers distinguishes the Dee procedure
from  a  review  that  is  undertaken  completely  externally  and  independently  of  domestic
stakeholders (for example, in the OECD model).
With regard to commitments, Findlay (2006), drawing on Mattoo (2002), commented
on ways in which international negotiations and subsequent commitments could support
domestic reform, such as the value of commitments that are binding (including those to be
applied according to a schedule at a future date).  The possibility that trading partners can
seek compensation if policy change is not made adds to the credibility of their original
commitment.  Other contributions are market access, and the contribution that success
makes  to  (a)  mobilizing  export  interests  that  consequently  support  a  domestic  reform
programme, and (b) guidance in the direction of regulatory reform.
In answer to the question of what has been achieved by international negotiations,
Findlay (2006) noted that GATS so far “has not proved useful...as a vehicle to advance
market opening in this sector”.  GATS appears to have had limited impact on regulatory
cooperation.  Commitments in GATS have mainly reflected existing policy settings; however,
there is a lack of research either in support of its role in providing credibility to those
policies or to avoid backsliding.  Negotiations within GATS (either across sectors or across
modes  of  delivery)  appear  to  be  unable  to  overcome  the  domestic  political  hurdles  to
reform.  Countries acceding to WTO – and China in particular – have, however, made
significant commitments to reform.
Observations by Dee and others (2006) concerning trade facilitation suggest that
the political economy issues to be resolved in dealing with behind-the-border issues may
not be so much to do with domestic versus foreign interests, but rather incumbent versus
new entrant interests.  Preferential trade agreements, it might be argued, can be used to
deal  with  behind-the-border  matters.    However,  Dee  (2005)  argued  that  these  trade
agreements tended to be limited to measures that could be liberalized on a preferential
basis,  and  tended  to  target  only  those  provisions  that  explicitly  discriminated  against
foreigners.  These types of provisions tend to be rent-creating rather than cost-escalating.
Dee  and  others  (2006)  therefore  concluded  that  “the  gains  from  even  the  ‘new  age’
trade  agreements  are  trivial,  compared  with  the  gains  from  comprehensive  reform  of
non-discriminatory impediments to competition, as part of a thorough-going programme of
unilateral domestic regulatory reform”.
Capturing international spillovers is the third contribution of international cooperation.
Clarke and Evenett (2003) reviewed the arguments for collective action on one type of
a behind-the-border policy, i.e., competition policy.  They argued that political economy
considerations for collective action did not provide a case for collective action; however,
they identified other arguments.  They discussed these issues in the context of policy on190
cartels.  They suggested that an international agreement could strengthen the “positive
spillovers” or knock-on effects in other jurisdictions from action in one economy, or that
they could reduce the harm done by negative spillovers.  They cited examples of spillovers
related to the difficulties in obtaining evidence and cartel-related information.
Round and Findlay (2006) discussed other externalities related to the application of
competition policy in the transport sector, where firms are involved in cross-border operations.
Application of policy on mergers in one jurisdiction will affect consumers in others.  What
may improve welfare in one jurisdiction may reduce it in another; for example, one jurisdiction
may endorse a merger on public interest grounds, but the result could be a reduction of
competition and consumer losses in other markets.  Clarke and Evenett (2003) considered
issues associated with international cartels.
Conclusion
Is there a case for going behind the border in various forms of international collective
action related to trade and investment policy?  Yes, there clearly is a case.  Contributions
arise from the three Cs:
(a) The capacity to undertake and implement the recommendations of domestic
policy reviews;
(b) The option to commit to the new policies and avoid backsliding; and
(c) Methods to capture the spillovers in policymaking in different countries.
The questions remain of how far and how often to go behind the border, and how
to organize the work.  How far and how often is difficult to say.  The answer also depends
on the weight given to the motivations above.  The capacity-building motivation would lead
to  more  extensive  work  compared  to  initiatives  designed  to  deal  with  spillovers.    The
answer will also vary issue by issue and sector by sector.  A set of criteria built in part on
case study material might help.  But the question is worth asking and the three Cs provide
a framework for consideration, linking motivations for cooperation with the form of action.
The question is then how to organize the work of going behind the border.  WTO
offers significant capacity.  For example, Clarke and Evenett (2003) considered the case
for establishing minimum standards to deal with problems of non-enforcement of cartel
policy.  Such commitments might be made in WTO.  However, it will also be important to
consider the possibility of inappropriate enforcement of that policy.  They pointed out that
cooperation between national agencies would be important in securing the evidence to
prosecute cross-border cartels, and that “foreign firms are aware of their legal obligations,
of their procedural rights, and that they will be treated on a comparable basis as domestic
firms”.   They  concluded  by  arguing  that  for  minimum  standards  to  be  effective,  “other
multilateral  disciplines  on  voluntary  cooperation  and  core  principles  (transparency,
non-discrimination and procedural fairness) are required”.191
However,  no  one  institution  is  likely  to  provide  all  the  forms  of  international
cooperation for all purposes (see Soesastro and Findlay, 2006).  These contributions could
be made in a variety of institutions.  Each institution has different advantages, through its
membership (and therefore the ability to capture policy spillovers, for example), its rules of
operation and the capacity of its bureaucracy.  This suggests that a portfolio approach is
valuable,  as  is  a  clear  view  about  which  institute  is  best  at  which  activity.   APEC,  as
illustrated above, has strengths in the capacity-building work, and is not impeded by the
ways in which it devolves responsibility for work to groups of members.  For other cooperative
work,  a  stronger  secretariat  may  be  important.
5 Commitments might better be made in
organizations  that  are  managing  negotiating  processes,  WTO  in  particular,  rather  than
making commitments in preferential trading arrangements, as is questioned above.
5 The debate continues on the role of the APEC Secretariat.  See, for example, presentations to
the APEC Study Centre Network Preliminary Conference, Melbourne, December 2006, available at
http://www.apec.org.au/event2.asp?event=40.192
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HOW FAR SHOULD WE GO ‘BEHIND THE BORDERS’?
By Evan Due
As  successive  rounds  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations  have  eroded  tariffs  and
quotas, “behind the border” institutional and regulatory practices have come into sharp
focus.  These practices – from barriers around intellectual property rights, competition,
logistics and service sectors to technical barriers to trade, product, labour and environmental
standards – are of major concern to international businesses embedded in regional and
global production networks involving frequent cross-border transactions.  As shown in this
chapter, while traditional border barriers continue to be prominent in some countries in the
“sensitive” sectors, there has been a perceptible and real shift to “inland” domestic policy,
and regulatory and public sector constraints.
Findlay succinctly highlights significant trends such as the shift towards trade in
services and related processes, the shift in the composition of non-tariff barriers (e.g.,
away from financial to technical and domestic regulatory barriers), and the consequent
policy shifts pertaining to reforms in these areas.  He also underlines the significant gains
to be made from domestic reforms.  On these points, there is no doubt.  He then goes on
to emphasize an important role for “international cooperation” in facilitating such reforms
through capacity-building, bolstering commitments to change, and capturing spillovers in
different countries.  However, precisely what is meant by international cooperation is not
fully captured, and the question as to “how far to go” (and how often), is left dangling.  We
should therefore go a bit further.
A.  Balancing business and consumer interests
There is growing evidence that policy measures at the border are of significantly
less interest (and less concern) to business than those that regularly confront their various
activities within borders.  This is perhaps reflected in the importance that businesses place
on the agreement on trade facilitation in the WTO July 2004 package.  Conformity with
standards and regulations, be they health and safety, environmental or commercial, is also
an important domestic regulatory agenda where the interests of consumers are at play and
which  are  unevenly  represented.    Confronting  international  businesses  trying  to  reach
consumers with services and products they desire, is the problem that different standards
or specifications are often applied for the same end, resulting in huge transaction costs
and uncertainty.  In addition, while considerable multilateral efforts have, and are being
made  to  encourage  the  adoption  of  internationally  or  mutually  recognized  standards,
cooperation in those areas could go much further.
The political dimensions – what is seen by policymakers to be in the public interest
(or worse, in their own interests) – are often not understood in the same vein, and lobbying
groups have so far been weighted towards much narrower ends than the public good.  In198
many Asian countries, this is manifested in regulatory and administrative practices that
continue to be excessive, redundant and restrictive, presenting major costs (and political
risk) for international business.  Much has been discussed in the literature on the costs
and benefits, but less attention has, until recently, been given to the political economy of
domestic reform, and to the specific institutional contexts in which the various incentives
are embedded and structured.
While businesses operating in Asian countries are acutely aware of the costs they
incur as a result of these barriers, they have perhaps been less organized than entrenched
public sector interests or other competing domestic interests.  Findlay proposes in this
chapter that international cooperation might be an avenue for counteracting and reducing
these barriers.  While important in all the ways he mentions, the motivation and forms of
such cooperation also need unpacking in order to see where international business and
consumer interests intersect in policy debate.  For example, chambers of commerce and
other business associations as well as international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
such as the Consumer Unity Trust Society
1can (and should) significantly assist international
cooperation endeavours.  At the same time, they and their agents might also be targets for
what Findlay identifies as capacity-building, and building commitments.  International agencies
with particular interests in this area (e.g., ITC, UNCTAD and WTO) as well as research
institutions in Asian countries are important players in building coalitions for advocacy.
Other  actors  are  unions,  consumer  groups  and  domestic  NGOs  that,  although
often antithetical to international business interests, can be important allies in promoting
policy reforms where they recognize positive spillovers.  Thus, an important process of
interaction between a government, the private sector, the research community and these
other actors can be facilitated through public participation and by building coalitions of
interest on specific points of balance.
B.  Policy and practice
A major “behind the border” barrier that international business articulates as one of
the highest priorities in Asia is in the area of logistics and transportation (Duval, 2006).
Modest improvements here can lead to exports worth billions of US dollars with significant
positive  spillover  effects.    This  is  especially  so  with  landlocked  countries  where  poor
transportation infrastructure, coupled with weak institutions and poor coordination for trade
facilitation (notably customs procedures), entail enormous costs and negative consequences
for development.  These conditions are evident in the countries of the Greater Mekong
Subregion (GMS).
The  huge  investment  outlays  in  the  “economic  corridors”,  financed  largely  by
assistance  from  ADB,  are  an  attempt  to  build  regional  economic  integration  through
improvements  in  transportation  and  logistics  infrastructure.    However,  as  studies  have
1 See  Consumer  Unity Trust  Society  Institute  for  Regulation  and  Competition  and  its  interest  in
promoting collective action at their research symposium in March 2007 on “Political economy constraints
in regulatory regimes in developing countries”.199
pointed out (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2006; ESCAP, 2006; Thailand Development
Research Institute, 2007), international cooperation within Greater Mekong Subregion has
been  present  in  principle  but  less  so  in  practice.    Regional  cooperation  policies  and
expressions of good intent have not always permeated through to those who are tasked
with implementation, resulting in confusion and continued rent-seeking behaviour.
For example, an important development in GMS market integration has been the
“GMS Agreement for Facilitation of Cross-Border Transport of People and Goods” (CBTA).
Although signed in 2000, a number of protocols have yet to be ratified.  Implementation
has been slow and many barriers continue to exist, although they are not identified or
recognized  by  policymakers.    The  inexact  implementation  of  CBTA  revolves  around
a number of aspects, not least of which are political/institutional, and around which research
and  international  cooperation  along  the  lines  indicated  in  this  chapter  are  warranted.
Studies of the economic effects of cross-border transport and logistics infrastructure in
GMS demonstrate significant positive impacts for the region.
However, the lack of attention given to the institutional and public sector dimensions
– the barriers to implementation that international businesses regularly confront (and pay
for) – need to be better understood within their specific contexts.  Corruption in public
service along the logistics highway is a major concern, and research and capacity-building
efforts  for  technical  standardization  (and  harmonization  with  respect  to  specifications,
charges  etc.)  would  yield  significant  benefits.    International  cooperation  could  have  an
enormous impact through strong institutional arrangements embedded in agreements for
facilitating trade and investment.
Another feature of increasing regional market integration has been the surge in
cross-national production sharing, connected to global production networks.  ASEAN and
other regional groupings have placed much emphasis on promoting regional integration
and supporting policies in order to encourage the building of these networks, reflecting the
complementarity of trade profiles in the region.  Establishments embedded in these networks
have an important role, not only in addressing domestic policy reform but also in aiding
their implementation, since they are on the front lines.  Leading business representatives,
such as Victor Fung (2005), have shown to be practical advocates for reforms and they
need  to  be  engaged.    Regional  cooperation  involving  the  key  establishments  through
subregional arrangements can be an option.
C.  Contribution of international cooperation
International cooperation is usually thought of in terms of governments, international
agencies and international associations acting as the principal actors in addressing “behind
the border” issues related to trade and investment.  However, other important actors must
more actively be engaged in this process, such as international businesses, NGOs and the
research community.  They are able to provide the principal actors with information on the
true transaction costs and the incentive structures at play, and can aid in the three “Cs” –
capacity-building, commitment and capture.200
1.  Capacity-building
The importance of building capacity to design and implement domestic policy reform
cannot be understated.  Findlay cites studies including his own in order to demonstrate the
need for this approach.  However, there is a need to go further in defining the various
avenues and modalities, and to go beyond what might be lumped into a TRTA model or
other similar provisions of technical assistance.  The case can be made for more inclusive
policy reviews involving representatives from the business and research communities as
well  as  for  looking  more  closely  at  the  institutions  “behind  the  border”  to  see  how,
organizationally,  they  might  be  strengthened  and  restructured,  in  order  to  avoid  the
reproduction of incentive systems that capture rather than share the benefits of integration.
2.  Commitments
Commitments  made  in  multilateral  negotiations  can  support  domestic  reforms,
provided the modalities exist for ensuring that there is domestic policy coherence (and not
just within commerce), coordination and understanding.  Some multilateral negotiations
may not be able to achieve this alone, but may be assisted through bilateral and regional
efforts that can be more encompassing of domestic political considerations (although this
view may be questioned by Findlay).  While it is clear that comprehensive reforms at the
domestic level are needed, it is not certain that multilateral commitments alone will suffice,
notwithstanding the important achievements made in China.  Commitments made through
other  modalities  may  be  important  building  blocks  (rather  than  stumbling  blocks)  for
coordinated efforts to facilitate reform, especially if coupled with capacity-building.
3.  Capturing international spillovers
The scope for capturing spillovers is broad, and the evidence of competition policy
a good one.  Context matters, as already pointed out; here, it is worth considering further
how  the  application  of  policies  in  one  jurisdiction  might  impinge  on  another,  and  how
positive and negative spillovers can be appropriately managed.  There is a need for more
research  in  this  area  in  order  to  understand  better  the  political  economic  dimensions.
Evidence can boost collective action by the right players so long as there is also effective
coordination.  Regional institutions may be best placed for this type of activity, especially
where they are supported by research institutions and strong business associations.
Conclusion
It is true that no one institution is capable of all things, given core competencies
and comparative advantage.  A “portfolio approach” is indeed valuable, especially where it
can attract and capture the motivations of other key players in the policy process.  Brief
reference has been made to business associations and leading figures as well as NGOs
and the research community.  In addition, secretariats such as APEC or ASEAN might be
appropriate nodal institutions at the regional level, should it be possible to build up their
own institutional capacity for research, outreach and coordination.201
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